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Abstract
Recent long-run time series evidence for the US suggests that popular
explanations for the surge in executive pay are not supported by the data.
This paper explores the role of globalization for the rise in executive pay
based on new ﬁrm survey data on executives and their pay in Austria and
Germany. I ﬁnd that ﬁrms more exposed to international competition en-
gage in talent fairs to search and attract skilled workers. Furthermore, I
ﬁnd that seniority related pay varies for dierent levels of foreign compe-
tition suggesting that ﬁrms increase CEO pay when faced with the threat
of losing their senior executives to foreign competitors, while seniority in
o!ce itself does not lead to higher pay. These ﬁndings support the idea of
a ’war for talent’ that is triggered by international trade, as suggested by
recent theories of international trade and organisations.1. Non Technical Summary
Recent long-run time series evidence for the US suggests that popular explanations
f o rt h es u r g ei ne x e c u t i v ep a ya r en o ts u p p o r t e db yt h ed a t a . T h em a n a g e r -
rent seeking hypothesis put forward by Bebschuk and Fried 2004 appears to be
implausible because both the level of pay and the use of options were lower in the
1950s to the 1970s than in more recent years even though corporate governance
was weaker in the earlier period. Furthermore, the explanation put forward by
Gabaix and Landier (2008) that the rise in executive pay is due to increases in
ﬁrm size appears to be only weakly supported by evidence for the period prior to
the mid-1970s.
This paper explores the role of globalisation in the rise in executive pay based
on new ﬁrm survey data on executives and their pay in Austria and Germany. A
proper understanding of the rise in executive pay entails integrating the theory
of the ﬁrm with international trade theory. We look at rising executive pay from
the perspective of two important changes that have happened in the last two
decades: the changing nature of the corporation on the one hand and the stronger
integration of rich economies into the world economy on the other. Rising CEO
pay is an expression of both: a new way ﬁrms empower their managers as well as
an increase in the importance of international trade in rich countries. We argue
that an increase in trade exposure in rich countries in the last two decades has led
to a ‘war for manager talent’ which has changed the nature of the corporation.
Rather than machinery and the factory, managerial talent has become the new
asset of the ﬁrm. The challenge for ﬁrms is how can they prevent managers from
leaving the ﬁrm when international trade creates new career opportunities for
them outside the ﬁrm.
In this paper I test the hypothesis whether international trade has triggered a
competition for managers - a ’war for talent’ - through the entry of foreign ﬁrms. I
use new survey data on German and Austrian executives, their characteristics and
the human resource policies of their ﬁrms combined with other data sources to test
this hypothesis in two ways. First, I examine whether more foreign competition
leads ﬁrms to increase their participation in talent fairs to search and attract
talent. Second, I examine whether seniority-related CEO pay varies for dierent
levels of foreign competition. Do ﬁrms increase CEO pay when faced with the
threat of losing their senior executives to foreign competitors? I ﬁnd that ﬁrms
2more exposed to international competition engage in talent fairs to search and
attract skilled workers. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that seniority related pay varies for
dierent levels of foreign competition suggesting that ﬁrms increase CEO pay when
faced with the threat of losing their senior executives to foreign competitors, while
seniority in o!ce itself does not lead to higher pay. These ﬁndings support the
idea of a ’war for talent’ that is triggered by international trade, as suggested by
recent theories of international trade and organisations.
32. Introduction
Several explanations for the rise in executive pay have been put forward in the
literature. First, it has been argued that the adoption of compensation packages
with stock options, performance bonuses and other forms of incentive pay have
contributed to the increase in executive pay. Second, CEO compensation is seen
to have been driven by an increase in managerial entrenchment. According to this
view managers operate with little eective oversight in part due to the explosion of
stock-option pay and the boards’ inability to evaluate the true costs of this form of
compensation (Bebschuk and Fried 2004). Third, the rise in CEO compensation
is seen as the result of the substantial growth in the size and market value of US
ﬁrms (Gabaix and Landier 2008).
This paper explores the role of globalisation in the rise in executive pay. Why
is international trade a possible explanation for the rise in executive pay? Recent
long-run time series evidence for the US in the period 1936 - 2005 (Frydman and
Saks 2007) suggests that the above explanations for the surge in executive com-
pensation are not supported by the data. The manager-rent seeking hypothesis
put forward by Bebschuk and Fried 2004 appears to be implausible because both
the level of pay and the use of options were lower in the 1950s to the 1970s than
in more recent years even though corporate governance was weaker in the earlier
period. Furthermore, the explanation put forward by Gabaix and Landier (2008)
that the rise in executive pay is due to increases in ﬁrm size appears to be only
weakly supported by evidence for the period prior to the mid-1970s. Frydman
and Saks (2007) show that even the strong correlation between compensation and
ﬁrm size in more recent decades may be spurious.
This suggests that increases in ﬁrm size and manager pay may have both
been driven by a third variable namely increases in international trade due to
the stronger integration of rich economies into the world economy in the last
two decades. Two recent studies identify trade as a driver behind the changes
in executive pay. Frydman and Saks (2007) document a stronger sensitivity of
managerial pay to ﬁrm performance since the early 1970s in the US. Cunat and
Guadalupe (2006) show that increases in the sensitivity of managerial pay to
ﬁrm performance have been driven by a stronger exposure of US ﬁrms to im-
port competition. Adding import penetration as a further regressor in an OLS
regression on executive compensation explains 35 percent of the overall increase
in performance-pay sensitivities.
4A proper understanding of the rise in executive pay entails integrating the
theory of the ﬁrm with international trade theory. Most of the explanations on
executive pay (except Gabaix and Landier 2008) have in common that they focus
on failures in the internal control mechanism of ﬁrms but they neglect the market
environment in which ﬁrms operate, in particular the market for executives. Re-
c e n tr e s e a r c ho nt r a d ea n do r g a n i s a t i o n sw h i c hi sk n o w na st h e’ n e wn e wt h e o r yo f
international trade’ examines both the incentives inside ﬁrms as well as how these
incentives interact with the trade environment ﬁrms face. Hence, this theory is
particularly suited to explain the rise in executive pay.1
I nM a r i na n dV e r d i e r( 2 0 0 4 )( M V )w el o o ka tr i s i n ge x e c u t i v ep a yf r o mt h e
perspective of two important changes that have happened in the last two decades:
the changing nature of the corporation on the one hand and the stronger integra-
tion of rich economies into the world economy on the other. According to this
theory rising CEO pay is an expression of both: a new way ﬁrms empower their
managers as well as an increase in the importance of international trade in rich
countries. In MV we argue that increases in trade exposure in rich countries in
the last two decades has led to a ‘war for manager talent’ which has changed the
nature of the corporation.2 Rather than machinery and the factory, managerial
talent has become the new asset of the ﬁrm. The challenge for ﬁrms is how they
can prevent managers from leaving the ﬁrm when international trade creates new
career opportunities for them outside the ﬁrm.
In this paper I test the hypothesis whether international trade has triggered a
competition for managers - a ’war for talent’ - through the entry of foreign ﬁrms
as predicted by Marin and Verdier 2004. I use new survey data on German and
Austrian executives, their characteristics and the human resource policies of their
ﬁrms combined with other data sources to test this hypothesis in two ways. First,
I examine whether more foreign competition leads ﬁrms to increase their partic-
ipation in talent fairs to search and attract talent. Second, I examine whether
seniority-related CEO pay varies for dierent levels of foreign competition. Do
ﬁrms increase CEO pay when faced with the threat of losing their senior exec-
utives to foreign competitors? The paper is organised in ﬁve sections. Section
1For a review of the ’new new theory of international trade’, see Marin and Verdier (2003),
Spencer (2005), Helpman (2006), and Helpman, Marin, Verdier (2008).
2Peter Drucker, a well known author of managerial books and Mc Kinsey, a consultancy,
have both argued that the key battle of this century is what they call the ’war for talent’. For
recent corporate reorganisation in Europe, see Marin (2008).
53 presents some facts about executive pay in Germany and Austria. Section 4
presents an international trade theory of executive pay. Section 5 describes the
ﬁrm survey and the data. Section 6 presents the empirical results and section 7
concludes.
3. Some Facts about CEO Compensation in Germany and
Austria
Figure 1 provides average CEO total remuneration for the US and Germany.
German CEO pay is substantially smaller than US CEO pay and the rise is much
less pronounced in Germany. CEO pay at constant 2002 prices increased by a
factor of 3,5 in the US (from $ 2.7 million in 1992 to $ 9.4 million in 2002) and
by a factor of 2,5 among the top 100 German ﬁrms (from  590000 in 1990 to
 1.5 million in 2005). Trade openess (exports plus imports in percent of GDP)
in Germany increased by 86,4 percent (from 37 percent in 1994 to 69 percent in
2006) and in the US by 41,7 percent (from 20,4 percent in 1990 to 28,9 percent in
2007).













































































Average CEO Total Compensation, Largest 500 German Companies
Average CEO Total Compensation, Largest 100 German Companies
Average CEO Total Compensation, S&P 500 US Companies
Sources: Germany: Kienbaum, Management Consultants. Compensation, reported in inflation-adjusted 2002 Euros, is defined 
as fixed salary, fringe benefits, long-, mid- and short-term incentives (including stock options). 
US: Average pay level, reported in inflation-adjusted 2002 Dollars, is based on Execucomp Data for S&P 500 CEOs. 
Compensation is defined as the sum of fixed salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options, stock grants, and other compensation 
(Jensen, Murphy and Wruck 2004).
Table 1 oers additional information on the proﬁle of German and Austrian
executives. CEOs in Germany and Austria tend to be above 50 years of age, are
males and both countries tend to hire their own nationals as executives (in more
than 90 percent of ﬁrms). If ﬁrms in these two countries hire managers from
outside the country they mostly hire their own nationals from other countries or
non-nationals from other German speaking countries. The dominance of Germans
on German boards and Austrians on Austrian boards indicates that the market
for managers in Austria and Germany is still very segmented. This suggests that
executive pay in these two countries is not driven by a global competition for
executives. Given these numbers, the potential role of globalisation in the rise
of executive pay must come from international trade rather than from a global
labour market in executives.
7Table 1
Germany Austria
age below 50 24.3 31.6
females 2.0 6.9
CEO is national of country 91.1 92.0
college degree 88.1 92.9
technical degree 29.3 29.6
CEO hired from outside the country 30.7 26.7
of which are nationals 76.5 50.0
percentage of firms
Managers' Profile 
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, Firm survey of 430 German firms.
4. An International Trade Theory of Executive Pay
In Marin and Verdier (2004) we consider a human capital rich North and a labour
rich South. Each of these economies produces the two goods Y and X with the two
factors of production labor L and human capital H with wage rates z and t.W e
assume that good X is more skill intensive than good Y. Good Y is homogenous
and produced under perfect competition. Good X is dierentiated and produced
under monopolistic competition= Consumers’ preferences regarding the two goods
Ya n dX a r e
X([>\)=[
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In the X-sector ﬁrms can choose between three types of organisations, a P-
ﬁrm in which the owner has formal power, an A-ﬁrm in which the owner delegates
power to the division manager, and a single managed O-ﬁrm run by the owner
herself. The proﬁt-maximising choice of organisation is driven by the trade-o
between control and initiative in the ﬁrm. To start a ﬁrm the unskilled owner has
8to hire a skilled manager. The question I address now is how trade liberalisation
in the North leads to a rise in manager pay. I illustrate this with the help of
Figure 2.
Fig. 2 International Trade and the "War for Manager Talent" Fig. 2 International Trade and the "War for Manager Talent"
In Figure 2 the three curves xW
S>x W
D and xW
0 are the free entry conditions for
ﬁrms with a S-, D-, and R-organisation, respectively, which relate the ﬁrms’ real
operating proﬁts in terms of unskilled labour E@z to the start-up costs of a ﬁrm
which consists of hiring a skilled manager who is paid the wage t@z in terms of
unskilled labour. The free entry curves xW
S>x W
D and xW
0 may be called the "war for
talent" curves. They are upward sloping in E@z because when E@z increases as
a result of trade liberalisation in the North, new ﬁrms want to enter the market.
However, ﬁrms can enter and run a ﬁrm only by hiring a skilled manager. Hence,
market entry is constrained by the amount of managers available in the North.
9Newly entering ﬁrms compete with incumbent ﬁrms for scarce manager talent
and bid up the relative wage for managers. The bold line in Figure 2 gives the
organisational equilibria as a function of the start-up costs of ﬁrms t@z.A st h e
startup costs and the stakes rise, ﬁrms start to monitor more, thus potentially
destroying the initiative of their managers. To empower their managers, owners
delegate power to them and the ’talent ﬁrm’ emerges as an equilibrium. 3
5. Data
We conducted a survey among 430 German and Austrian ﬁrms to collect informa-
tion on the CEO’s proﬁle and the ﬁrms’ human resource policies. The selection of
ﬁrms were guided by the availability of data on CEO compensation. We gathered
information on seniority in o!ce, citizenship, education, sex and age of the top
CEO as well as information on ﬁrms’ human resource policies, such as whether the
ﬁrm has an ongoing recruitment policy, whether human resources is represented
on the board of managment as well as whether the ﬁrm actively searches for talent
by participating in talent fairs. The German data on CEO compensation are from
Kienbaum Management Consultants which consists of a sample of 1500 German
corporations. In addition we have collected executive compensation data for Aus-
tria via the internet. CEO compensation includes ﬁxed salary, bonuses, short-
and long-term bonus payments including stock options. The compensation data
are average compensation per board member. We then merged the survey data
and the CEO wage data with previous survey data of 660 German and Austrian
global corporations described in Marin (2006) and Marin and Verdier (2008). Af-
ter merging these data sets 130 ﬁrms (100 German and 30 Austrian ﬁrms) for
the year 1999 and 2000 remain for which information on executive compensation
as well as on other ﬁrm characteristics are available. A description of the list of
v a r i a b l e su s e di nt h i sp a p e ri sg i v e ni nT a b l e2 .
3For more details on how the factor endowment of a country aects the mode of organisation




Description Mean Minimum Maximum Stand. Dev.
foreign competition foreign competition as perceived by firms
very many competitors 599 dummy variable equal to 1 and 0 otherwise when firm 
does not enter the market
many competitors 599 dummy variable equal to 1 and 0 otherwise when firm 
faces many foreign competitors
few or no competitors 599 dummy variable equal to 1 and 0 otherwise when firm 
faces few or no foreign competitors
CEO pay 107 CEO compensation per board member in EUR. It is the 
total compensation of executive board divided by the 
number of board members. It includes fixed salary, 
short- and long-term bonus payments, and stock 
options.
650042 17767 4842604 703493
Germany 83 650126 17767 4842604 769979
Austria 24 649751 194575 1823600 408839
manager age 319 age of the CEO in years 54.2 37 73 6.5
manager sex 377 dummy variable equal to 1 if manager is female
citizenship dummy variable equal to 1 if manager has
336 German citizenship
25 Austrian citizenship
manager education dummy variable equal to 1 if manager has
324 technical degree
348 college degree
D=1,  112 observations
Table 2                               Data Description
D=1,  47 observations
D=1, 440 observations
D=1,  9 observations
D=1,  306 observations
D=1,  23 observations
D=1,  95 observations




Description Mean Minimum Maximum Stand. Dev.
CEO hired from outside 
country
295 dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO hired from outside 
Germany or Austria
talentfair ratio 638 number of talentfairs the firm actively participates in to 
search for students graduating from universities. The 
number of talentfairs the firm visits is normalised by 
dividing it by the 8 largest German (2 largest Austrian) 
talentfairs taking place in th
0.03 0 1 0.12
manager in job 354 number of years the CEO is in office 5.1 0 33 5.2
export ratio 495 ratio of firm's export to firm's sales 0.4 0 15 0.8
academics / employment 241 ratio of the number of workers with an academic degree 
to the total number of workers *100
15.4 0 334.7 27.3
employment 620 firm's number of workers. 3564 1 233000 16422
# affiliates 652 firm's number of subsidiaries in Eastern Europe 3.3 1 41 3.8
price-cost margin 296 firm's cash flow divided by firm's sales. 12.9 -51.2 1497.1 94.4
cashflow/capital 309 firm's cash flow to physical capital stock. 5.6 -133.1 1014.2 60.2
country 652 dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is Germany 
and 0 if it is Austria
Table 2                               Data Description continued
D=1,  90 observations
D = 1, 449 observations
6. Evidence
The theory generates two predictions. First, an increase in international trade in
the North (given in Figure 2 by a rise in proﬁts E@z) is expected to trigger a
competition for managers - a ’war for talent’- through the entry of foreign ﬁrms
as described by the free entry curves xW
S>x W
D and xW
0 in Figure 2. I proxy the
’war for talent’ by the eorts ﬁrms make to attract and search for talent. Second,
international competition is expected to lead to a rise in manager pay given by
t@z in Figure 2 through a competition for managers. I now test each of these
predictions in the following sections.
126.1. International Competition and the Search for Talent
I ﬁrst examine the inﬂuence of foreign competition on the intensity with which
ﬁrms engage in activities to search and attract talent. I use as the dependent vari-
able wdohqwidluv which measures the intensity of search for talent. I consider the
largest talent fairs taking place each year in the respective country (8 in Germany
and 2 in Austria) as possible venues for this search activity. I then calculate the
intensity of search for talent by dividing the number of talentfairs ﬁrms participate
in by the number of the 8(2) talent fairs taking place in the respective country. My
main indicator for foreign competition is a subjective measure of the number of
foreign competitors as perceived by ﬁrms. Foreign competition is a set of dummy
variables taking the value 1 and zero otherwise when ﬁrms face very many, many,
few or no foreign competitor, respectively. As the number of competitors does
not always capture the intensity of competition in a market (competition can be
tough among two ﬁrms) I use as an alternative measure the price cost margin
(pdunxs).
Table 3 presents the results. The ﬁrst column estimates the basic speciﬁcation
controlling for ﬁrm size (employment), a country dummy for Germany as well as
for sector ﬁxed eects. The estimated coe!cients on foreign competition are all
positive and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level suggesting that ﬁrms faced with
more competition search more for talent by visiting more talent fairs. However,
an F-test rejects the null that the coe!cients of pdq| = yhu|pdq| and of ihz=
yhu|pdq|, while it does not reject the null that ihz= pdq|. This indicates that
the relation is non-monotonic. When faced with very many foreign competitors
ﬁrms tend to visit talent fairs less often then with many competitors. Marin and
Verdier 2004 explain this non-monotonic relation in the following way. When there
is not much foreign competition the start-up costs of hiring a manager are low and
owners run the ﬁrm themselves. When new ﬁrms enter the market, they have to
hire a manager to start a ﬁrm. Newly entering ﬁrms compete with incumbent ﬁrms
for managers, driving up wages for managers and the start-up costs of ﬁrms. Firms
delegate power to their managers to encourage their initiative. When competition
keeps increasing, however, at some point the start-up costs of ﬁrms become so
large that owners again take control and rely less on their managers to run the
ﬁrm.
Also, larger ﬁrms tend to engage more in talent fairs. Column 2 examines
in addition whether more skill intensive ﬁrms (academics/employment) are more
13engaged in the search for talent. Not surprisingly, this is supported by the data.
The relationship is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Column 3 includes the num-
ber of subsidiaries in eastern Europe of these ﬁrms (#a!liates) as an alternative
measure for the international exposure of ﬁrms. The relationship is signiﬁcant
and positive at the 10 percent level.
Columns 4 and 5 include the price cost margin as an alternative measure of
competition. Column 4 estimates the basic speciﬁcation allowing for the possibil-
ity that the relation between talent fairs and competition is non-monotonic. The
estimated coe!cient on price cost margin is positive and highly signiﬁcant sug-
gesting that ﬁrms with larger proﬁt margins (less competition) visit talent fairs
more frequently. The test of non-linearity in the relation is rejected by the data.
The proﬁt margins of ﬁrms reﬂect domestic as well as foreign competition. To
capture the eect of foreign competition, I include ﬁrms’ exposure to exports in
column 5. As expected, ﬁrms more exposed to export competition tend to increase
their participation in talent fairs. I also ﬁnd that the eect of ﬁrm size and of
competition (measured by the proﬁt margin) varies for dierent levels of exposure
to exports. Larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with larger price cost margins will engage less
in talent fairs when more exposed to export competition. The results suggest that
the search for talent is driven by trade rather than competition as such.
14Dependent Variable (mean=0.03)
foreign competition
few competitors 0.057*** 0.109*** 0.067***
[4.670] [4.046] [4.913]
many competitors 0.044*** 0.069** 0.055***
[4.427] [2.547] [4.310]
very many competitors 0.032*** 0.056** 0.040***
[3.136] [2.093] [3.365]
employment 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.019***
[4.764] [3.046] [4.506] [3.636] [2.676]
# affiliates 0.009*
[1.895]
academics / employment 0.014**
[2.517]
price-cost margin 0.008** 0.013**
[2.086] [2.481]




employment * export ratio -0.011**
[1.976]
price-cost margin * export ratio -0.022*
[1.656]
country 0.012 0.005 0.018* 0.023 0.011
[1.429] [0.216] [1.901] [1.622] [0.623]
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 568 219 568 213 168
Adjusted R-squared 0.364 0.484 0.366 0.531 0.601
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects from ordinary least squares estimations. The numbers in brackets are robust t-values corrected for arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix at the firm level. All continous variables are transformed in logs. The F-test does not reject the null that the coefficients of
few=many (F=0.86, p-value=0.355) and rejects the null of many=very many (F=3.51, p-value=0.061) and the null of few=very many (F=3.67, p-
value=0.055) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Determinants of a "War for Talent"
Participation in Talentfairs
(5)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3
6.2. International Competition and CEO Pay
I now turn to test whether ﬁrms change their CEO pay when faced with the threat
of losing their executives to foreign competitors. To estimate the inﬂuence of
foreign competition on CEO pay I use average compensation per board member as
the dependent variable. I use the same subjective measure of foreign competition
as before. However, since I lose many observations when the data are merged
with the CEO pay data from Kienbaum, I use ’no and few foreign competitors’
as the omitted category rather than ’no foreign competitor’.4 Table 4 presents
4I do not have enough observations to use the price-cost margin as an alternative measure of
competition in the CEO pay estimation.
15the results. The speciﬁcation in column 1 estimates the sensitivity of CEO pay
to foreign competition and to the ﬁrms’ proﬁtability (cashﬂow/physical capital
stock) controlling for ﬁrm size (employment), a country dummy for Germany, and
sector ﬁxed eects. In addition, I include the interaction between ﬁrm size and
the proﬁt rate (employment*cashﬂow/capital) allowing performance pay to vary
with ﬁrm size, as the sample includes large as well as smaller ﬁrms.
Foreign competition does not appear to inﬂuence the level of pay, while ﬁrm
size as well as ﬁrm performance lead to a statistically signiﬁcant increase in com-
pensation. Depending on speciﬁcation, a 10 percent rise in ﬁrm size increases
CEO pay between 1.4 percent and 2.5 percent and a 10 percent rise in the proﬁt
rate increases pay in the range of 3.5 percent and 4.6 percent. The estimated
coe!cient on employment*cashﬂow/capital is signiﬁcant and negativ suggesting
that the proportion of proﬁts devoted to performance-related pay of executives
appears to be larger among smaller ﬁrms.5
Cunat and Guadalupe 2006 emphasise in their paper the role of foreign com-
petition for the importance of incentive related CEO pay for US ﬁrms. I control
for the same eect here by interacting proﬁts with foreign competition in column
2 to test whether the slope of performance-related pay varies for dierent levels
of foreign competition. When foreign competition is very tough (very many com-
petitors) the variable component of pay becomes somewhat more sensitive to ﬁrm
performance (the relationship is signiﬁcant at the 12 percent level).
Finally, in column 3 I test for whether seniority related CEO pay varies for dif-
ferent levels of foreign competition. Surprisingly, I ﬁnd that the number of years
in o!ce does not appear to increase executive pay. The coe!cient on manager in
job is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms
faced with more foreign competitors indeed appear to increase the compensation
of their senior executives. The eect is signiﬁcant and sizeable. Apparently, ﬁrms
faced with the threat of losing their experienced executives to their competitors
raise wages to prevent them from leaving the ﬁrm. Note that the inclusion of man-
ager in job and its interaction with foreign competition improves the overall sta-
tistical properties of the regression. In column 4 I revisit the question of whether
5T h em o r ep r e v a l e n tu s eo fp e r f o r m a n c ep a ya m o n gs m a l l e rﬁ r m si sf o u n di ns e v e r a ls t u d i e s
and is consistent with optimal contracting, see Edmans and Gabaix (2008).
16an increase in foreign competition leads ﬁrms to switch more to performance-
related pay. The coe!cient on very many competitors*cashﬂow/capital indeed
now becomes signiﬁcant and substantially increases in size.
7. Conclusion
In this paper I ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that globalisation induces compe-
tition for managers, resulting in a rise of CEO pay as suggested by Marin and
Verdier 2004. I ﬁnd that more foreign competition leads ﬁrms to increase their
participation in talent fairs to search and attract talent. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that
ﬁrms increase CEO pay when faced with the threat of losing their senior execu-
tives to foreign competitors while seniority in o!ce itself does not lead to higher
pay. I interpret these results as evidence for a ’war for talent’.
17Dependent Variable (mean=13.07)
foreign competition
many competitors 0.12 0.07 -0.388
[0.485] [0.203] [0.883]
very many competitors 0.001 0.378 -0.336
[0.002] [0.938] [0.668]
employment 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.249*** 0.244***
[3.915] [3.934] [4.105] [3.894]
cashflow/capital 0.346*** 0.372** 0.456*** 0.358***
[3.011] [2.468] [3.341] [2.805]
employment*cashflow/capital -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.040* -0.034
[3.147] [2.862] [1.794] [1.583]
foreign competition*cashflow/capital
many competitors -0.021 0.05
[0.377] [0.543]
very many competitors 0.144 0.219**
[1.658] [2.208]
manager in job -0.459** -0.402**
[2.190] [2.175]
foreign competition*manager in job
many competitors 0.532** 0.408**
[2.223] [2.232]
very many competitors 0.595** 0.678**
[2.485] [2.493]
country -0.385** -0.405* -0.720*** -0.774***
[2.057] [2.018] [3.433] [3.637]
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 58 58 42 42
Adjusted R-squared 0.308 0.286 0.37 0.358
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
average CEO compensation per board member
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects from ordinary least squares estimations. Robust t-values corrected for
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at the firm level in brackets. All continous variables are transformed in logs.
Determinants of CEO Pay Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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